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Abstract

This paper investigates one causal mechanism that may explain why female judges on the
federal appellate courts are more likely than men to side with plaintiffs in sex
discrimination cases. To test whether personal experiences with inequality are related to
empathetic responses to the claims of female plaintiffs, we focus on the first wave of
female judges, who attended law school during a time of severe gender inequality. We
find that female judges are more likely than their male colleagues to support plaintiffs in
sex discrimination cases, but that this difference is seen only in judges who graduated
law school between 1954 and 1975 and disappears when more recent law school cohorts
of men and women judges are compared. These results suggest that the effect of gender
as a trait is tied to the role of formative experiences with discrimination.
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Trailblazers and Those That Followed:
Personal Experiences, Gender, and Judicial Empathy
You know, the young women today can't possibly…understand the pressures of being
first. . . Nothing was good enough, and it took me an awful lot of years to realize how
good many of the women really were in relationship to the men's talents. I mean, when I
think of it, men that were hundreds of places below us in class were getting great jobs
and there were no jobs for us.
- Judge Ilana Rovner1
Every time I wanted to do something, I had to invent a way to do it because there was no
path for me.
- Judge Shirley Hufstedler2
When U.S. Courts of Appeals’ judges Ilana Rovner and Shirley Hufstedler
graduated from law school in 1966 and 1949, respectively, nationwide, women
comprised less than 5 percent of all law students (www.americanbar.org). In contrast, in
2011, women made up 46 percent of all students enrolled in law school. These judges’
comments about the obstacles they faced as trailblazers when entering the legal
profession are quite similar to the recollections of former U.S. Supreme Court justices
Sandra Day O’Connor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg about overtly discriminatory treatment
in law school and the legal profession in the 1950s and 60s (Ginsburg & O’Connor 2010).
Oral histories of the first women appointed to the lower federal judiciary repeatedly touch
1
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Library of Congress, Washington, DC. Transcript of oral history of Ilana Diamond
Rovner, Karen A. Clanton interviewer. Dates of interviews: August 20, 28, September 28,
November 8, 2007, pp. 20-21.
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Center. Transcript of interview with Shirley Hufstedler, Sarah Wilson interviewer. Date
of interview: March 10, 1995, p. 11.
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upon the themes of blatant discrimination against women by law professors, fellow law
students, and employers. When this trailblazer generation of female judges joined
formerly all-male courts, many of them also came face-to-face with exclusionary
traditions and practices in their new circuits (Haire & Moyer 2015). For instance, when
Florence Allen joined the Sixth Circuit as the first woman, she dined alone at lunchtime
because her male colleagues frequently lunched at private clubs that did not admit
women.3 Given how widespread discriminatory treatment was for early female
appointees, did their personal experiences with discrimination affect how these judges
confronted the issue of sex discrimination in their cases?
Recent research on the U.S. Courts of Appeals has established that female judges
are more likely than men to side with plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases (Boyd et al.
2010; Peresie 2005) and other types of employment discrimination cases (Songer et al.
1994; Moyer & Tankersley 2012).4 Scholars have speculated that women’s personal
experiences with sex discrimination (and men’s lack of such experiences) could be
driving this effect (Martin et al. 2002). For instance, in a survey of Carter’s female
appointees, many of whom attended law schools during periods marked by stark gender
inequality, 81% described some form of sex discrimination as the primary challenge
3
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facing a woman or man in law (Martin 1990: 207). How might these women judges’
personal experiences affect their perspective on cases dealing with sex discrimination?
Building on research by others who have examined men’s and women’s attitudes toward
gender equality, we test the premise that the propensity to support sex discrimination
plaintiffs should be highest among the group of “trailblazer” women who entered the
legal profession during a time when overt discrimination against women was severe and
prevalent. We posit that this increased likelihood to side with sex discrimination
plaintiffs is not attributable merely to being a woman, per se, but rather about the
experiences that shaped this particular class of women defined by when they attended law
school. As such, our argument fits into a large body of work by sociologists that has
focused on the formative experiences of generations and cohorts (Mannheim [1928]
1952; Kertzer 1983; Schuman & Scott 1989).
The linkage between traits, empathy, and experiences is an important one to
understand because this connection has been emphasized by those involved in the
selection of those who will sit on the federal bench. When President Obama referenced
the term “empathy” in his nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court, it was
in the context that an individual’s personal experiences would allow them to better
understand the plight of those bringing their claims to court (Weisman 2009). Indeed,
recent scholarship has uncovered other ways that personal experiences can affect judging
(e.g., Haire & Moyer 2015). For instance, one study found that conservative male judges
became more supportive of plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases after having daughters,
leading the authors to conclude that empathy could have a crosscutting effect with respect
to ideology (Glynn & Sen 2015).
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Below, we review the state of the literature on attitudes toward and perceptions of
sex discrimination, and how this research might be applicable to the study of federal
judges. We then set forth our theoretical account that links psychological research to
explain how the personal experiences of judges lead them to draw different inferences
from case fact patterns involving claims of sex discrimination. We test our hypotheses
using a sample of sex discrimination cases from the U.S. Courts of Appeals (1995-2008)
and find evidence that the earliest wave of female judges who confronted overt
discrimination in law school and the legal profession were more likely to side with
plaintiffs in cases of sex discrimination. We conclude by examining the implications of
our finding for accounts of judging more generally and for the judicial selection process.

Attitudes about gender inequality and discrimination
To understand how a judge’s personal experiences could translate into greater
judicial support for sex discrimination plaintiffs, we must first know something about
men and women’s attitudes toward gender inequality and discrimination. Overall,
researchers are in agreement that, on most issues, attitudes about women in the workplace
and roles within the family have liberalized over time (Carter et al. 2009; Bolzendahl &
Myers 2004; Simon & Landis 1989). For instance, surveys from the early 1970s showed
that a majority of all respondents rated the women’s movement unfavorably, but that by
1974, a majority rated the movement favorably (Huddy et al. 2000).5 Researchers

5

However, question wording can affect the magnitude of these results. For instance, the

term “feminist” tends to elicit lower levels of support compared to the term “women’s
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attribute this liberalization to a combination of individual attitude change and population
replacement (Brewster & Padavic 2000; Ciabattari 2001). In addition to period effects,
the literature also reports small or no differences at all in gender role beliefs when men
and women are compared over time (Bolzendahl & Myers 2004; Crosby 1982).6
However, there is some indication that men and women in the mass public differ
in their perceptions of sex discrimination specifically. In a comparison of surveys from
1975 to 1987, Simon & Landis (1989) report that the percentage of female respondents
who perceived discrimination against women increased by ten points, while the
percentage of men with this view actually dropped slightly.7 In more recent surveys,
women express significantly higher levels of support for gender-based affirmative action
than men, but attitudes about the existence of gender discrimination are also an important
movement” (Huddy et al. 2000; Buschman & Lenart 1996), although support for both
terms is highly correlated (Rhodebeck 1996).
6

Commonly used questions that tap into gender role beliefs ask about the desirability of

women working outside the home, the desirability of women participating in politics, and
whether children are negatively affected when their mothers work outside the home.
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A related debate in the literature discusses whether both men and women can be

feminists (Klein 1984; Rhodebeck 1996). We do not take a position on whether a judge
must be a feminist, per se, in order to express high levels of support for sex
discrimination plaintiffs; for one thing, the existing data do not provide us with any
reliable information about whether judges consider themselves to be feminist or
supportive of feminism more generally, so we are unable to test for any effect of such
identification.
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predictor (Kane & Whipkey 2009). Brewster & Padavic (2000) compare 1977 and 1996
GSS data, finding that men are significantly more conservative than women in their
attitudes about working women in both time periods, and also that men’s attitudes have
been slower to change than women’s (despite a liberalizing trend over time).
Employed women in particular appear to be more aware of sex discrimination
than other groups (Negowetti 2014; Simon & Landis 1989). Surveys of lawyers (Epstein
2004; Coontz 1995) and doctors (Carr et al. 2000) also reveal this difference in awareness
of gender bias as well, with women seeing both discrimination and sexual harassment in
employment contexts more often than men.
Experimental research by social psychologists also supports the general
conclusion from survey data that women perceive sex discrimination and sexual
harassment more often than men (O’Connor et al. 2004; Rotundo, Nguyen, & Sackett
2001; Wiener et al. 1995; Wiener et al. 1997). One study speculates that “women are
more likely to find evidence of harassment because they are more sensitive to sexual
misconduct than are men” (Wiener at al. 2004: 62).
In assessing the applicability of these strands of research to understanding judicial
decision making processes, research that uses experimental methods or asks subjects to
evaluate vignettes is most similar to the judicial setting, where judges carefully consider
the detailed facts of a case in making their ruling. Judges are confronted not with
discrimination in the abstract (as a question on a survey), but with “the empirical realities
of women's lives” (MacKinnon 2002: 832), which they must evaluate in light of
controlling legal doctrines. For instance, a plaintiff claiming disparate treatment under
Title VII must show that “but for” her sex, she would not have been subject to an adverse
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employment action. O’Connor et al. (2004: 91) point out that being able to “put oneself
in the target’s shoes will affect the extent to which one believes the target’s story about
the complex facts at issue.”
Judges in discrimination cases must be able to put themselves in the “shoes” of
both the plaintiff and the defendant because of legal doctrines that structure their decision
making. For example, in cases of employment discrimination brought under Title VII,
judges employ shifting burdens analyses in disparate treatment claims. As another
illustration, in a sexual harassment case, a judge will evaluate whether a “reasonable
person” would concur with the plaintiff’s assessment that she faced a hostile work
environment. A theoretical construct that relates to this process of understanding is the
concept of empathy, which scholars have leveraged to explain why legal decision makers
side with particular parties (Negowetti 2014; Glynn & Sen 2015). In the next sections,
we draw on this line of research to develop a framework for our analysis that connects
empathy with gender and judging.

Judging and empathy
Plumm & Terrance (2009: 191) define empathy as “the ability of one person
(observer) to take on the perspective of another (actor).” They go on to distinguish
between trait empathy and situational empathy. Trait empathy is triggered by a similarity
between the observer and actor, such as gender or race; situational empathy occurs when
imagining oneself in the situation of the actor. The latter type of empathy can be induced
in experimental manipulations where the subject is explicitly tasked with placing him or
herself in the “shoes” of another person. However, group membership (e.g., race or
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gender), when salient, can mediate the effects of situational empathy that might be
induced in an experiment or in a case; for instance, white mock jurors who were induced
to feel empathy toward black or white criminal defendants still routinely “sentenced” the
black defendants more harshly than their white counterparts (Johnson et al. 2002). Other
research on the role of empathy in juror decision making has found that female mock
jurors are much more likely to side with battered women who kill, regardless of
empathetic induction strategies (Plumm & Terrance 2009). While men who were
induced to feel more empathy for the battered woman in this study did express more
positive views of the victim than men not in the empathy induction condition, overall
men were still less supportive of the defendant than women were. Finally, compared to
men, female mock jurors showed higher levels of empathy toward a rape victim in a
mock trial, particularly those mock jurors who had personally experienced rape (Dietz et
al. 1982).
These studies suggest the utility of drawing an analogy between empathetic
induction as presented in experimental research (“situational empathy”) and decision
making that requires a judge to understand the actions of a plaintiff and defendant in a
case alleging sex discrimination. (Recall that situation empathy refers to the ability to
imagine oneself in another person’s situation.) As the studies above indicate, situational
empathy may vary depending on one’s ability to observe a similarity between oneself and
the other person (“trait empathy”). In the context of sex discrimination, trait empathy
suggests that women should identify with an alleged victim who was also a woman.
Empirical findings also support this approach, pointing to persistent differences between
men and women’s understanding of sex discrimination that is linked to the degree to
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which each group can relate to claims of sex discrimination. We argue, however, that it
is not simply a trait that affects the type of empathetic response but how well members of
that group (i.e., women) can relate to the position taken by the plaintiff. Women who
experienced severe, first-hand discrimination will be particularly sensitive to claims of
sex discrimination alleged by other women. Our argument considers next how these
empirical findings can be extrapolated to help understand the behavior of federal judges
in cases of discrimination.

Judge gender and discrimination
Existing surveys provide support for the contention that women and men on the
federal bench will vary in their views about the prevalence, causes, and consequences of
gender inequality in society. One study, conducted by Elaine Martin, surveyed President
Carter’s judicial appointees to the lower federal courts (30 women and 92 men).
Responses to several questions point to major differences between men and women in
areas relevant to sex discrimination. Fifty-five percent of all women reported “frequently”
experiencing conflicts between career and family when their children were younger,
compared with only 28 percent of male respondents. This cohort of female appointees
also expressed higher levels of support for the women’s movement (86 percent) relative
to the male appointees (56 percent). Perhaps the most striking difference came in
response to a question about one’s major problems as a woman or man in the law.
Female judges overwhelmingly (81 percent) made explicit reference to experiencing
some form of sex discrimination, like “bias against women” or the “belief that a woman’s
place is in the home” (Martin 1990: 207). In contrast, male respondents referenced
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professional challenges or time management challenges as a major problem in the law
(Martin 1990: 207). Martin concludes, “Women judges in this study, perhaps as a
consequence of these personal experiences, evidence greater attitudinal feminism than
men” (1990: 208).
A second study (P. Martin et al. 2002) draws from a 1988 survey on gender bias
conducted by the Florida Supreme Court Task Force. (The respondents included Florida
attorneys and judges of both sexes.) The authors argue that women’s greater experiences
with gender bias will sensitize women, more than men, to these issues (667). Consistent
with these expectations, women lawyers and judges reported observing more gender
harassment and sexual harassment than their male counterparts. Interestingly, male
judges reported the fewest observations of gender bias of any group (even compared with
male attorneys). The analysis also compared men and women’s responses in several
areas that tapped into a feminist consciousness: rape myths, maintaining the traditional
division of labor in the home (“separate spheres”), divorce property rights, stereotypes of
women, and domestic violence.8 Among judges, women expressed significantly more
feminist answers than men in every area except for “separate spheres” (in which there
was no significant differences between the sexes). Martin et al. (2002) conclude that,
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that women and girls are systematically discriminated against, (2) the belief that this
dynamic is wrong, and (3) and the belief that collective action is necessary to correct this
wrong. However, they differ from Klein insofar as they posit that both men and women
can have feminist consciousness (Martin et al. 2002: 671).
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overall, there is a strong relationship between observations and feminist consciousness
for the women in the survey, but not for the men.
Public statements by female judges themselves support our central argument that
many experienced sex discrimination and that such experiences informed their work on
the bench. As part of the American Bar Association oral history project “Women
Trailblazers in the Law,” many of the first wave of female appellate judges were
interviewed about their experiences in law school and the legal profession. While these
interviews represent only anecdotes as opposed to systematic data, the comments within
do shed some light on the challenges faced by women who were among the first to be
appointed to the federal appellate bench.
First, in terms of experiences in law school, many of these judges attended law
schools in which the number of women in their class was in single digits. Both Shirley
Hufstedler (a Johnson appointee) and Cynthia Hall (a Reagan appointee) discussed
separately in their oral histories that they were one of only two women in their Stanford
law school classes. Ruth Bader Ginsburg (JD 1959) told The New York Times that the
low number of women often meant additional scrutiny and pressure: “[M]ost sections
had just 2 women, and you felt that every eye was on you. Every time you went to answer
a question, you were answering for your entire sex…You were different and the object of
curiosity” (Bazelon 2009).9 Hall attended law school at a time when many veterans were
using the GI Bill to earn law degrees and observed that her fellow students were critical

9
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of her for “taking a good man's place.”10 Law faculty could also be hostile toward the
few female students in their classes. For instance, Stephanie Seymour (JD 1965)
describes how both professors and male classmates were “overt and obvious” in
expressing their opinion that “I didn’t belong there simply because I was female.”11 Two
female judges (Patricia Wald and Cynthia Hall) who attended different law schools, Yale
and Stanford, both recalled that law professors liked to call on women more often than
men when discussing rape cases (Wald 1994, 980).12
Once in the legal profession, many of these women encountered blatant sex
discrimination from employers. Judge Betty Fletcher (JD 1956) recalled that she was
blindsided by the discrimination she experienced when she was looking for a job right
after law school, describing the prejudice as hitting her “like a ton of bricks.”13 In their
oral histories, both Mary Schroeder (JD 1965) and Carolyn King (JD 1962) discuss
experiences with flagrant discrimination during their time in private practice. When
Schroeder learned she was pregnant, she was advised to keep her pregnancy a secret;
10
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similarly, King was informed that she was denied promotion to partner because the other
partners believed that she should be at home with her children. A somewhat later
appointee, Rosemary Barkett (JD 1970) told an interviewer that she frequently heard
from other women lawyers that “they could not maintain their positions in the law firms
and have children” and that she believed this was a wrong that needed to be remedied.14
Some women also faced hostility when they became judges. For instance, the
first woman appointed to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, Florence Allen (JD 1914) was not
welcomed to the Sixth Circuit by her new male colleagues. Kenney (2013: 141) writes
that the other judges “had in fact opposed her appointment. Three judges failed to write a
customary letter of congratulation.” Another colleague “was so distressed he reportedly
took to his sickbed for two days following her appointment” (Ginsburg & Brill 1995:
283).
A few of these “trailblazer” judges have gone farther than simply cataloguing
their experiences with discrimination and noted how their past has informed their actions
as judges. For instance, Judge Patricia Wald (JD 1951) writes, “a judge is the sum of her
experiences and if she has suffered disadvantages or discrimination as a woman, she is
apt to be sensitive to its subtle expressions” (2005: 989). Similarly, when she was the
only woman on the Ninth Circuit, Hufstedler (JD 1949) noted that many of her male
colleagues “had a hard time seeing the world as it really is” in sex discrimination cases,

14
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and that she would tease them about things like “irrelevant” weight limitations on women
for carrying packages.15
To summarize, survey results reported in the literature demonstrate that women
judges are generally more aware of gender bias and sex discrimination than men. Oral
histories and public statements by women in the first cohort of federal appellate judges
document experiences with blatant sex discrimination in law school and the profession.
And comments by two judges in particular suggest that their behavior in sex
discrimination cases was influenced by their own experiences as and observations about
women.

Linking gendered experiences and judicial behavior
As we alluded to in the introduction, there is a growing body of evidence in the
U.S. Courts of Appeals literature showing that female judges are more likely to support
the plaintiff in sex discrimination cases (Boyd et al. 2010; Peresie 2005), as well as in
other types of employment discrimination cases (Songer et al. 1994). Their presence
alongside male judges on a panel is also associated with favorable outcomes for female
plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases (Moyer & Tankersley 2012) and in causing male
colleagues to support plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases (Boyd et al. 2010) and other
employment discrimination cases (Farhang & Wawro 2004). These scholars speculate
that women’s greater sensitivity to gender bias because of their personal experiences may
be driving the differences between men and women. Our argument builds on this
contention and suggests that first-hand experience with severe, pervasive discrimination
15
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was commonplace for the first wave of female judges because of the unique set of
circumstances these women faced.
[Figure 1 about here]
The oral histories of the “trailblazer” women appointed to the federal bench
describe a vastly different environment for those who attended law school in the 1950s,
60s, and early 70s when compared to those who received their law degrees in later eras.
To illustrate, Figure 1 displays the percentage of enrolled women in law school from
1947 to 2011. It is important to note that the numbers from the 1940s and 50s are
suppressed in part because many law schools openly refused to admit women until the
1960s (Mossman 2006). As the judges’ comments from the previous section indicate,
women who attended law school in earlier eras often felt isolated and under tremendous
pressure because of their small numbers. They also experienced harassment and outright
hostility from male classmates and faculty.16 One such judge, Ruth Bader Ginsburg has
recounted that during her time at Harvard Law School, the dean invited all the female
students to his house for dinner, only to ask them why they were taking places that could
have been occupied by deserving men (www.oyez.org).
Another shared set of experiences among the earliest female judges is the
employment environment that they faced. Prior to the 1964 passage of Title VII,
16
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pervasiveness and degree over time.
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employers could legally refuse to hire qualified women. Because employers continued to
engage in discriminatory practices into the 1970s (Epstein 1983), the passage of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 provided additional enforcement powers to
the federal government. However, other measures, including the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act (1978), were needed to promote equal employment opportunities for
women in the workplace.
As summarized above, the passage of civil rights laws and societal expectations
about working women shifted substantially over time. But beyond effects that signify
societal shifts, we argue that, for the first wave of female judges, their personal
experiences with sex discrimination and gender-based hostility were qualitatively unique,
even compared with the sexism experienced by women who became lawyers in later eras.
In particular, their small numbers in law schools heightened their isolation and
encouraged scrutiny of them in ways that men never experienced as part of their
professional training. We thus contend that the first “trailblazer” wave of female judges
should have distinctive decision-making patterns that reflect these personal experiences
with discrimination.17 However, as women’s representation in the law increased and the
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As such, we draw from perspectives in sociology that contend that formative

experiences can have “sticking” power and are carried forward, affecting attitudes later in
life (Mannheim [1928] 1952; Schuman & Scott 1989). For instance, one study that
examined collective memories of major events found that younger women were more
likely to volunteer that the women’s movement was an “especially important” national
event during their lifetime, but not older women or any men (Schuman & Scott 1989).
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legal culture shifted to reflect this, differences between men and women judges in their
responses to sex discrimination should diminish over time.
The empathy literature in social psychology reviewed above suggests the utility of
drawing on this concept in building a theoretical account of judicial decision making. In
an analysis focused on race, Weinberg and Nielsen (2012) use an empathetic perspective
to examine district court decisions on motions for summary judgment in civil rights cases.
They argue that when evaluating whether a case should go forward at this stage, a trial
judge’s decision depends largely on his or her perception of an employer’s actions
against a plaintiff (2012: 323). At the appellate level, circuit judges also may review
whether the facts of the case (in the light most favorable to the appealing party) supported
a summary judgment decision. Appeals involving sex discrimination claims under
McDonnell Douglas v. Green and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine
also require appellate judges to assess whether the district court committed reversible
error in their assessment of whether the plaintiff showed, by a preponderance of evidence,
that her employer discriminated against her. As part of the analysis for Title VII
disparate treatment claims, judges must assess the actions taken against the plaintiff and
whether the defendant’s explanation for those actions are mere pretext.
In this respect, all appellate judges are potentially induced by the very nature of
their task to put themselves in the situation of the plaintiffs (i.e., situational empathy).
However, we expect that there will be variation in their responses linked to whether the
judge can relate personally to the plaintiff’s experiences or whether they are inclined to
be more deferential to the defendant’s arguments. Past experiences with sex
discrimination should, in effect, prime those women who experienced severe
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discrimination during their professionally formative years to be more responsive to
female plaintiffs alleging discriminatory treatment because of their sex. However, as
experience with overt discrimination diminishes over time, so too should gender
differences. Thus, we test the argument that it is a gendered experience with
discrimination, rather than gender alone, which enhances the likelihood of a response in
support of the plaintiff.

Hypothesis
As described above, trailblazer women’s recollections of their time in law school
and private practice indicate that many of their male classmates, male professors, and
male colleagues did not respond favorably to the novelty of working with women as
peers. The intensity and overt nature of the discrimination they experienced should prime
this group of women to be more receptive to claims of sex discrimination. Thus, while
men and women who attended law school at the same time are both part of the same law
school cohort, we expect that their formative experiences during this stage of their legal
career were fundamentally different with long term effects flowing from these
experiences over the course of their judicial careers.
Our review of public opinion research on attitudes toward working women
indicates a clear, liberalizing trend over time (Ciabattari 2001; Brewster & Padavic 2000).
One study of surveys about the desirability of married women working outside the home
even concluded there were no significant differences between men and women after 1975
(Simon & Landis 1989). As such, we hypothesize that the trailblazer group of women
will be more likely than men of the same generation to support the position of the
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plaintiff in sex discrimination cases, but that differences between male and female judges
will decrease in more recent law school cohorts.

Data and Measures
Our study draws from the dataset of sex discrimination cases in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals used by Boyd et al. (2010) and originally compiled by Sunstein et al. (2006).
Updated by Epstein et al. (2013), the cases extend from 1995 to 2008 and include both
sex discrimination and sexual harassment claims (Sunstein et al. 2006: 159). We
supplemented these data by collecting additional biographical information from the
Federal Judicial Center on a judge’s legal education, including the year in which he or
she received his or her law degree. Where a judge was listed as having multiple law
degrees (i.e., J.D. and L.L.M), only the first degree was recorded.18 Table 1 lists all
female judges appointed to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, denoting those who appear in the
dataset along with their birth year, appointment cohort, and year they completed their law
degree. The median male judge in our sample was born in 1937 and completed their
legal education in 1963, while the median female judge was born in 1944 and finished
law school in 1971.
[Table 1 about here]
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actually a L.L.B., not a J.D., as was fairly common prior to the 1960s.
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The dependent variable in our analysis is the case outcome supported by a judge’s
vote (coded 1 if pro-plaintiff and 0 if pro-employer). 19 Our central independent variables
of interest are a judge’s sex (1= female, 0 = male) and the law school graduation year.
Because we argue that the effect of gender is contingent upon when a judge attended law
school, we create an interaction term between judge sex and law school graduation
year.20
We begin by looking at the gender composition of the student population enrolled
in law schools beginning in 1947 (the first year for which aggregate data are available),
shown in Figure 1. The law school enrollment data point to a distinctive shift that took
place in the decade of the 1970s. In 1950, the percentage of women enrolled in law
school was 3 percent, and the figure rose only slightly to 3.4 by 1960. However, the
percentage of women enrolled in law school rose from 8.6 in 1970 to 34 percent in 1980.
19

According to Sunstein et al. (2006: 159), the directionality of the cases is coded as

liberal (1) if the plaintiff was afforded any relief and conservative (0) if the defendant
won. Epstein et al. (2013: 202) recoded cases in which the plaintiff was a man claiming
sex discrimination to “other” (rather than as “liberal” or “conservative”). These cases are
not included in our analysis, so that all the plaintiffs in our study are women.
20

Existing scholarship on gender differences in attitudes between and among men and

women in the mass public has used an individual’s birth year to determine cohort
assignment (Sapiro 1980; Ciabattari 2001). We opted against using this
operationalization for our main analysis, given that our argument focuses on the
experiences and socialization of individuals in law school and immediately afterward in
the workforce.
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Similarly, the average of the percent change from the previous year was less than half a
percentage point in the 1960s, but 2.5 percent during the decade of the 1970s.21
We also account for other factors that influence judicial voting. The most
important competing explanation for liberal voting in sex discrimination is a judge’s
ideological predisposition, which has been shown to have consistent effects on judicial
voting in the Courts of Appeals (Zorn & Bowie 2010; Sunstein et al. 2006). We utilize
the Judicial Common Space scores (Epstein et al. 2007; Giles et al. 2001), continuous
measures of ideology that range from -1 (most liberal) to +1 (most conservative). The
JCS measure is used to estimate individual judge preferences, as well as circuit
preferences (median circuit JCS score). Following Epstein et al. (2013), we also control
for the policy preferences of the panel by including two dummy variables that indicate
whether the other two judges were both Democratic appointees (1 = yes, 0 = no), or both
Republican appointees (1 = yes, 0 = no). (The excluded category is a panel with one
Democrat and one Republican.) Because standards of appellate review encourage
deference to the district court, another variable accounts for the ideological direction of
the district court decision (1= liberal, 0 = conservative). In addition to including fixed
effects for circuit and year, we estimate models with robust standard errors clustered on
judges.

21

The most recent year in which a female judge in our sample completed law school was

1992, so we are unable to evaluate the voting behavior of a sufficient number of female
judges who attended law school in equal numbers as men (i.e., the mid-1990s and
onward).
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Analysis
Table 2 presents the results from a logit model that estimates the likelihood that a
judge will cast a pro-plaintiff vote in a sex discrimination case.22 The control variables
perform largely as predicted. Judicial policy preferences are partially driving voting
behavior in sex discrimination cases; the variable for judicial ideology is correctly signed
and significant at the .001 level. While being seated with two Democratic appointees is
positively related to casting a liberal vote relative to voting by judges on “mixed” panels,
being seated with two Republicans does not have a statistically significant effect. If the
district court found in favor of the plaintiff, as expected, a judge is more likely to cast a
pro-plaintiff vote, too. The control for circuit ideology fails to reach statistical
significance.
Turning now to the interaction between judge sex and JD year, the coefficient
does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. However, because the
coefficients and standard errors on an interaction term in a logit model are not directly
interpretable, we must assess the statistical and substantive significance of the judge sexlaw school year interaction by graphing the marginal effects at quantities of interest
(Brambor et al. 2006). In Figure 2, we graph the marginal effect of being female
conditioned by the law school graduation year, holding continuous variables at their
medians and dichotomous variables at their modal values. Because there are very few
observations in our data from women who attended law school in the 1940s and 1950s,
22

In the appendix, we present results from a logit model that replicates the finding of

Boyd et al. (2010), showing that female judges, on average, are more likely to cast a
liberal vote in sex discrimination cases than male judges.
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we utilize 90 percent confidence intervals in our graph, though similar results obtain
when 95 percent confidence intervals are used.23 The resulting plot shows strong support
for our argument about the important effects of socialization into the legal profession on
gendered judicial decision making in sex discrimination cases.
[Figure 2 about here]
First, as Figure 2 shows, the marginal effect of being female is highest in the
earliest cohorts and declines steadily with more recent JD cohorts. This decline is more a
function of the sizeable drop in female judges’ pro-plaintiff voting (a .12 drop between a
1943 graduate and a 1991 graduate) than changes in male judges’ voting, which is
relatively flat (only a .02 change over the entire time period). Second, the difference
between men and women is only statistically significant during a twenty-one year
window: law school classes of 1954 through 1975.24 And while we can only speculate
why the effect becomes insignificant after 1975, the law school enrollment numbers may
shed some light, particularly if we focus on the rate of growth from year-to-year, rather
than just the percentage of enrolled students who were female (see Figure 3). According
to the ABA data, during the 1947-2011 period, 1974 was the year with the single largest
23

When 95 percent confidence intervals are used, significant differences between men

and women are seen from 1961 to 1972.
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Interestingly, Unger et al. (2010: 447) quote a prominent female psychologist who also

identifies this period as an important one for her professionally: “If anyone believes that
I credit [the women’s movement] too much for changes in my own life, I have only this
reply: I know that I did not become a significantly better social psychologist between
1969 and 1972, but I surely was treated as a better social psychologist.”
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year-to-year increase (4.1 percent) in the percent of law students who were female. After
this peak, the rate of growth in women’s enrollment experienced a steady decline from
1975 onward.25
[Figure 3 about here]
As a robustness test, we also re-estimated the model without the interaction term,
instead conceptualizing a clear delineation point at which the socialization dynamics
changed. We selected 1975 as the cut-off year for several reasons. First, as discussed
above, 1974 was a record year for the growth in women’s law school enrollment and
growth slowed beginning in 1975 (though women’s enrollment did continue to increase
until around 2000). By this time, Title VII had been in place for a decade and had been
reinforced by additional federal legislation in 1972. Additionally, surveys show that, at
this point, men and women’s attitudes about working women no longer diverge (Simon &
Landis 1989) and that a majority of Americans had shifted their views of the women’s
movement to be more favorable than unfavorable (Huddy et al. 2000).
For this analysis, we created a series of dummy variables indicating whether the
judge was a female who graduated law school before 1975, a female who graduated in
1975 or later, a male who graduated before 1975, or a male who graduated in 1975 or
later. The results, shown in the Appendix, tell a similar story: significant differences
25

We also estimated another model (not shown) in which we included a variable that

measures the ABA’s reported percentage of women enrolled in law schools in that year.
(The figure is aggregated over all law schools in a given year.) This indicator had very
little variation in certain eras, particularly since the 1980s, and did not yield a statistically
significant effect.
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emerge between the earliest group of women (JD before 1975) and men of the same
generation, but disappear when men and women who graduated in 1975 or later are
compared with each other.26 There are no significant differences found between women
who graduated before 1975 and women who graduated afterward. Thus, it seems that
gender differences in voting in sex discrimination cases are not static, but instead vary in
ways that correspond to major changes in gendered socializing experiences in the legal
profession and society.

Discussion
Our analysis makes clear that recent scholarship finding differences between men
and women judges in sex discrimination cases is being driven in part by the voting
behavior of the cohort of trailblazer women. While it may seem unsurprising that a group
that includes President Carter’s nominees would be liberal in their voting patterns, it
should be noted that this group also includes judges appointed by Reagan, George H.W.
Bush, and Clinton. (Indeed, in our data, 36 percent of the observations of women with
law degrees before 1975 were Republican appointees.) As Judges Hufstedler, a
Democratic appointee, and Rovner, a Republican appointee, observed in the opening
quotes, the experience of always being first was a challenging one – and formative for
how these women would view the challenges faced by other women in the workplace.
26

When seated on a panel with one Democrat and one Republican, a female judge with a

JD before 1975 has a .29 probability of a pro-plaintiff vote while a male judge from the
same era has a .25 probability. (These probabilities are calculated with continuous
variables held at their medians and dichotomous variables held at their modal values).
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Judges Hufstedler, Rovner and others in the first wave of female judges entered
the legal profession during a period of immense change in attitudes about gender and
opportunities for women. From 1954 to 1975, the percentage of women enrolled in law
school skyrocketed from just under 4 percent to nearly a quarter of all students. Before
1965, employment discrimination against women was not banned by federal law, and
even after the passage of Title VII, the implementation of its protections did not happen
overnight, particularly in male-dominated professions like the law. The shared sense of
struggle among the trailblazer women bonded them together as law students (Ward 1994,
980) and later when they blazed a new trail as federal judges. Indeed, both Mary
Schroeder and Dolores Sloviter told separate interviewers that the 10 women that Carter
appointed to the U.S. Courts of Appeals always remained close, despite being scattered
across the country (Haire & Moyer 2015, 105).27
Beyond this particular issue area, our findings have important implications for
judicial selection. Our results challenge the assumption held by many involved in the
nomination and confirmation process that particular traits (gender, race, and ethnicity
among others) predict future voting behavior consistent with stereotypes about empathy
in which women judges are expected to support women in cases of sex discrimination or
African Americans are more likely to support minorities in cases of race discrimination.
27

Women Trailblazers in the Law Project, Transcript of oral history of Mary Murphy

Schroeder, pp. 79-80. Women Trailblazers in the Law Project Oral Histories, Box 10,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, transcript of oral history of
Dolores Korman Sloviter. Amelia Helen Boss interviewer, dates of interviews: June 26,
August 18, 2006; April 13 and July 25, 2007, p. 98.
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We find evidence that judicial empathy for a plaintiff who alleges discriminatory
treatment is not borne from a trait, but instead appears to form from experiences with
discrimination. While we focus on first-hand personal experiences with sex
discrimination and their connection to empathy, other recent work suggests that personal
experiences in the context of parent-child relationships can change judicial behavior as
well (Glynn & Sen 2015). Both of these perspectives emphasize the role of personal
experiences in affecting behavior in ways consistent with empathetic responses.
Can male judges be sensitized to the claims of sex discrimination plaintiffs?
While we find no evidence that male judges from more recent cohorts were liberalized by
their experiences attending law school with large numbers of women, the literature does
show that men change their voting behavior when seated with women in discrimination
cases (Boyd et al. 2010; Peresie 2005; Farhang & Wawro 2004). Moreover, experimental
research suggests that through empathetic induction, men are able to better take the
perspective of female criminal defendants (Plumm & Terrance 2009: 202-203). Taken
together with our findings, we think this suggests that male judges can be made aware of
the realities of discrimination through working closely with female colleagues,
particularly those whose own perspective on discrimination comes from their personal
experiences. Future research should explore whether the addition of new judges who
attended law school during the post-2000 era (when men and women’s enrollment were
close to parity) is connected to other behavioral or attitudinal impacts that can be traced
back to that formative experience.
Although scholars generally theorize that the effect of gender on judicial decision
making operates differently than the effect of race, our findings suggest that, in the
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context of judging civil rights claims, there may be similar causal mechanisms at
work. The oral histories of women judges emphasize that trailblazers personally
contended with gender inequality in law school (and society) and hinted at how this
shapes their views on the bench. Here, we argue that it is this sense of shared struggle
with discrimination that accounts for their response to plaintiffs when evaluating their
claims. This is similar to the account advanced to explain why African Americans,
including judges, are more likely to support the claims of minorities in affirmative action
cases and Voting Rights Act cases (Kastellec 2013; Cox & Miles 2009; Cox & Miles
2008). Oral histories, public opinion scholarship and biographical accounts emphasize
that more recent African Americans—including legislators and judges—continue to feel a
strong sense of shared fate that fosters a perspective where a black judge can empathize
with a plaintiff who has faced potentially similar circumstances (Haire & Moyer
2015). Moreover, as with sex discrimination cases (Boyd et al. 2010), African-American
judges appear to be able to change the voting behavior of white colleagues on a panel so
that they are more supportive of the position of the minority (Kastellec 2013).
These findings underscore the importance of scholars continuing to investigate the
role that empathy may play in judging, including its role in shaping interactions on
appellate panels. Informed by literature that identifies both trait and situational empathy
(Plumm & Terrance 2009), the results from our study are consistent with the
interpretation that empathy is not triggered simply by a demographic trait, but may be
better conceptualized as having been primed by one’s life experiences and induced
through the act of judging, similar to how it is induced in experimental settings.
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Table 1: Female Judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeals
All appointees through 2008
Year of
Birth

Year J.D.
earned

Nominating president,
Year Appointed (Circuit)

Florence Allen^

1884

1914

FDR, 1934 (6th Cir.)

Phyllis Kravitch

1920

1943

Cornelia Kennedy

1923

1947

Carter, 1979 (5th Cir.)
Carter, 1981 (11th Cir.)
Carter, 1979 (6th Cir.)

Betty Fletcher

1923

1956

Carter, 1979 (9th Cir.)

Shirley Hufstedler^

1925

1949

Johnson, 1968 (9th Cir.)

Dorothy Nelson

1928

1953

Carter, 1979 (9th Cir.)

Patricia Wald

1928

1951

Carter, 1979 (D.C. Cir.)

Cynthia Hall
Dolores Sloviter
Ruth Ginsburg^
Diana Murphy
Jane Roth
Amalya Kearse*
Maryanne Barry
Rosemary Pooler
Carolyn King^
Ilana Rovner
Rosemary Barkett
Judith Rogers*
Mary Schroeder
Stephanie Seymour
Pamela Rymer
Carol Mansmann
Martha Daughtrey
Diana Motz
Susan Black
Alice Batchelder
Karen Henderson
Marsha Berzon
Sandra Lynch
Deannell Tacha
Marjorie Rendell
Mary Briscoe

1929
1932
1933
1934
1935
1937
1937
1938
1938
1938
1939
1939
1940
1940
1941
1942
1942
1943
1943
1944
1944
1945
1946
1946
1947
1947

1954
1956
1959
1974
1965
1962
1974
1965
1962
1966
1970
1969
1965
1965
1964
1967
1968
1968
1967
1971
1969
1973
1971
1971
1973
1973

Reagan, 1984 (9th Cir.)
Carter, 1979 (3rd Cir.)
Carter, 1980 (D.C. Cir.)
Clinton, 1994 (8th Cir.)
GHW Bush, 1991 (3rd Cir.)
Carter, 1979 (2nd Cir.)
Clinton, 1999 (3rd Cir.)
Clinton, 1998 (2nd Cir.)
Carter, 1979 (5th Cir.)
GHW Bush, 1992 (7th Cir.)
Clinton, 1994 (11th Cir.)
Clinton, 1994 (D.C. Cir.)
Carter, 1979 (9th Cir.)
Carter, 1979 (10th Cir.)
GHW Bush, 1989 (9th Cir.)
Reagan, 1985 (3rd Cir.)
Clinton, 1993 (6th Cir.)
Clinton, 1994 (4th Cir.)
GHW Bush, 1992 (11th Cir.)
GHW Bush, 1991 (6th Cir.)
GHW Bush, 1990 (D.C. Cir.)
Clinton, 2000 (9th Cir.)
Clinton, 1995 (1st Cir.)
Reagan, 1985 (10th Cir.)
Clinton, 1997 (3rd Cir.)
Clinton, 1995 (10th Cir.)

Judge name
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Edith Clement

1948

1972

GW Bush, 2001 (5th Cir.)

Karen Moore
1948
1973
Clinton, 1995 (6th Cir.)
Frank Hull
1948
1973
Clinton, 1997 (11th Cir.)
Edith Jones
1949
1974
Reagan, 1985 (5th Cir.)
Ann Williams*
1949
1975
Clinton, 1999 (7th Cir.)
Susan Graber
1949
1972
Clinton, 1997 (9th Cir.)
Janice Brown*
1949
1977
GW Bush, 2005 (D.C. Cir.)
Julia Gibbons
1950
1975
GW Bush, 2002 (6th Cir.)
Diane Wood
1950
1975
Clinton, 1995 (7th Cir.)
Consuelo Callahan*
1950
1975
GW Bush, 2003 (9th Cir.)
Reena Raggi
1951
1976
GW Bush, 2002 (2nd Cir.)
Karen Williams
1951
1980
GHW Bush, 1992 (4th Cir.)
Allyson Duncan*
1951
1975
GW Bush, 2003 (4th Cir.)
Margaret McKeown
1951
1975
Clinton, 1998 (9th Cir.)
Deborah Cook
1952
1978
GW Bush, 2003 (6th Cir.)
Johnnie Rawlinson*
1952
1979
Clinton, 2000 (9th Cir.)
Sonia Sotomayor*
1954
1979
Clinton, 1998 (2nd Cir.)
Priscilla Owen
1954
1977
GW Bush, 2005 (5th Cir.)
Helene White
1954
1978
GW Bush, 2008 (6th Cir.)
Kim Wardlaw*
1954
1979
Clinton, 1998 (9th Cir.)
Sandra Ikuta
1954
1988
GW Bush, 2006 (9th Cir.)
Susan Neilson^
1956
1980
GW Bush, 2005 (6th Cir.)
Diane Sykes
1957
1984
GW Bush, 2004 (7th Cir.)
Debra Livingston^
1959
1984
GW Bush, 2007 (2nd Cir.)
Catharina Haynes
1963
1986
GW Bush, 2008 (5th Cir.)
Jennifer Elrod^
1966
1992
GW Bush, 2007 (5th Cir.)
Notes: * = judge is either African-American or Latina. ^ = judge did not decide any sex
discrimination cases included in the dataset. The nominating president refers to the
president that nominated the judge to the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
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Figure 1
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Table 2: Logit Model of Pro-Plaintiff Voting in Sex Discrimination Cases
U.S. Courts of Appeals (1995-2008)

Female judge
JD year
Female judge x JD year
Judge ideology
Seated with DD
Seated with RR
Liberal lower court
Circuit ideology
Second Circuit
Third Circuit
Fourth Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Sixth Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Eighth Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Tenth Circuit
Eleventh Circuit
DC Circuit
Constant
N

Coefficient
(RSE)
25.3
(44.3)
-.004
(.006)
-.013
(.022)
-.631**
(.141)
.398**
(.186)
-.180
(.115)
1.10**
(.132)
.785
(.654)
1.16**
(.438)
1.41**
(.340)
.705**
(.277)
-.329
(.232)
.505
(.278)
-.012
(.196)
-.246
(.195)
.845**
(.401)
-.098
(.261)
.029
(.275)
.763
(.401)
7.26
(12.2)
1694

40

Notes: **p < .05 (two-tailed). Robust errors are clustered on the judge. Controls for year
omitted for space. All models are significant at p <.001. The First Circuit is the excluded
reference category.
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Figure 2: The Diminishing Differences Between Men and Women over Time

Notes: The plot shows 90% confidence intervals around the marginal effect. When the
confidence intervals include 0 (as shown by the solid horizontal line), then there is no
statistically significant difference between men and women.
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Figure 3

43
Appendix: Supplemental Analyses of Law School Cohorts
Logit models of the likelihood of a pro-plaintiff vote in sex discrimination cases
U.S. Courts of Appeals (1995-2008)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Coeff.
Coeff.
Coeff.
Coeff.
Coeff.
(RSE)
(RSE)
(RSE)
(RSE)
(RSE)
Female judge
.282*
----(.153)
Female—JD
--.033
.301*
.176
before 1975
(.285)
(.175)
(.317)
Female—JD
--.033
-.267
.209
1975 or later
(.285)
(.253)
(.253)
Male—JD
--.301*
-.267
--.092
before 1975
(.175)
(.253)
(.201)
Male—JD 1975
--.209
-.176
.092
-or later
(.253)
(.317)
(.201)
Judge ideology
-.655**
-.657**
-.657**
-.657**
-.657**
(.142)
(.142)
(.142)
(.142)
(.142)
Seated with DD
.401**
.398**
.398**
.398**
.398**
(.185)
(.186)
(.186)
(.186)
(.186)
Seated with RR
-.174
-.175
-.175
-.175
-.175
(.115)
(.115)
(.115)
(.115)
(.115)
Liberal lower
1.10**
1.10**
1.10**
1.10**
1.10**
court
(.131)
(.132)
(.132)
(.132)
(.132)
Circuit ideology
.789
.785
.785
.785
.785
(.652)
(.653)
(.653)
(.653)
(.653)
Second Circuit
1.15**
1.14**
1.14**
1.14**
1.14**
(.437)
(.436)
(.436)
(.436)
(.436)
Third Circuit
1.41**
1.39**
1.39**
1.39**
1.39**
(.342)
(.342)
(.342)
(.342)
(.342)
Fourth Circuit
.676**
.671**
.671**
.671**
.671**
(.284)
(.285)
(.285)
(.285)
(.285)
Fifth Circuit
-.343
-.346
-.346
-.346
-.346
(.227)
(.228)
(.228)
(.228)
(.228)
Sixth Circuit
.491
.487
.487
.487
.487
(.276)
(.273)
(.273)
(.273)
(.273)
Seventh Circuit
-.036
-.027
-.027
-.027
-.027
(.196)
(.202)
(.202)
(.202)
(.202)
Eighth Circuit
-.262
-.264
-.264
-.264
-.264
(.193)
(.194)
(.194)
(.194)
(.194)
Ninth Circuit
.838**
.831
.831
.831
.831
(.400)
(.401)
(.401)
(.401)
(.401)
Tenth Circuit
-.114
-.120
-.120
-.120
-.120
(.262)
(.263)
(.263)
(.263)
(.263)
Eleventh
.025
.012
.012
.012
.012
Circuit
(.277)
(.283)
(.283)
(.283)
(.283)
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DC Circuit
Constant
N

.744
(.388)
-1.76**
(.366)
1694

.737
(.393)
-1.46**
(.397)
1694

.737
(.393)
-1.46**
(.397)
1694

.737
(.393)
-1.46**
(.397)
1694

.737
(.393)
-1.46**
(.397)
1694

Notes: ** p < .05 (two-tailed test). * p < .05 (one-tailed test). Robust errors are clustered
on the judge. Controls for year omitted for space. All models are significant at p < .001.
In Model 2, the excluded category is women who graduated law school before 1975. In
Model 3, it is women who graduated law school in 1975 or later. In Model 4, it is men
who graduated before 1975, and in Model 5, it is men who graduated in 1975 or later. In
all models, the First Circuit is the excluded reference category.

